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Abstract
Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted
as games of strategic interactions, where a player’s well-being depends on her own action as well as on
the actions taken by her neighbors. Whereas much attention has been devoted to the identification and
characterization of Bayes-Nash equilibria of such games, in this work we look at strategic interactions from
an evolutionary perspective. Starting from a recent mean-field analysis of the evolutionary dynamics in
these games, here we present results of numerical simulations designed to find out whether Nash equilibria
are accessible by adaptation of players’ strategies, and in general to find the attractors of the evolution.
Simulations allow us to go beyond a global characterization of the cooperativeness of the equilibria and
probe into the individual behavior. We find that when players imitate each other, the evolution does not
reach Nash equilibria and, worse, leads to very unfavorable states in terms of welfare. On the contrary,
when players update their behavior rationally, they self-organize into a rich variety of Nash equilibria,
where individual behavior and payoffs are shaped by the nature of the game, the structure of the social
network and the players’ position within the topology. Our results allow us to assess the validity of the
mean-field approaches and also show qualitative agreement with theoretical predictions for equilibria in
the context of one-shot games under incomplete information.
1 Introduction
In a range of social and economic interactions (public goods provision, job search, political alliances, trade,
friendships, information collection, and so on) an individual’s welfare depends both on her own actions and on
the actions taken by her interacting partners. Much effort has been devoted to understand how the pattern
of social connections shapes the choices that individuals make and the payoffs that they can earn [1–7]
(see [8–10] for an overview of the field). On the theoretical side, the traditional approach of identifying the
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Bayes-Nash equilibria in one-shot network games is problematic due to the existence of multiple equilibria
(even for very small network sizes), which imply a huge range of possible outcomes. Nevertheless, it has
been shown that the problem of multiplicity can be resolved sometimes by the introduction of incomplete
information [11, 12]—which in the context of network games means having only a local knowledge of the
network: a player is aware of the number of her connections (her degree) but not of the degrees of the
others. The key point is that when players have limited information about the network they are unable
to condition their behavior on its fine details, and this leads to a significant simplification and sharpening
of equilibrium predictions. A general framework for the study of multiplayer games on networks under
incomplete information has been recently developed [13, 14]; in particular, Galeotti et al. [14] proved the
existence of Bayes-Nash equilibria involving strategies that are monotonic with respect to players’ degrees
and symmetric, i.e., with all players of the same degree choosing the same strategy.
Here, instead of focusing on equilibrium strategies played once and for all, we consider iterated network
games within an evolutionary framework [15]: players’ own actions are described by a strategy which is
subject to an evolutionary process [16, 17]. It is important to note that this is different from the stochastic
stability approach presented for this type of games in [18], where the focus is on the different time regimes
of the evolution. In fact, our framework represents a way to select among the large multiplicity of equilibria
that exist in network games in a spirit very close to that of biological evolution. In particular, we consider
two main mechanisms for players to adapt their strategy: imitation and rational deduction. Moreover,
we consider two representative social network structures (Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs [19] and scale-free
networks [20]) and, as in [14], two canonical types of interaction: the best-shot game and the coordination
game, as representatives for strategic substitutes and strategic complements, respectively [21]. We run a
numerical simulation program in order to understand which Nash equilibria are dynamically accessible (by
adaptation of players’ strategies), and in general to identify the strategy configurations that are the attractors
of such dynamics—either Nash equilibria or, possibly, other types of stationary states. As a reference, we
consider the analytical results we obtained in [22], where we studied this issue by means of two mean field
approaches, the usual, homogeneous one, and its heterogeneous version [23]. As shown below, the numerical
simulations allow us to assess the accuracy of the pictures provided by the two approaches and, furthermore,
to gain more insight on the individual behavior of the different types of players. Additionally, we compare
our approach with the theoretical framework of Galeotti et al. [14] for one-shot games under incomplete
information. We show that the Nash equilibria predicted by their theory generally do not coincide with
the ones obtained by evolutionary dynamics; nevertheless, these equilibria possess qualitatively the same
features of those resulting from evolution, in terms of players’ strategies with respect to their neighborhood
structure.
Our work is organized as follows. We begin by introducing in Section 2 the games we will be considering,
followed by a presentation of the two evolutionary dynamics in Section 3. Section 4, the main part of the
paper, presents the results of numerical simulations, which, for reference, are accompanied by a brief review
of the mean field results in [22]. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper with a summary of the results and a
discussion of how they compare to the different theoretical frameworks.
2 Games and Equilibria
This section presents two simple games played on networks, reflecting strategic substitutes and strategic
complements, respectively [21]. These two cases represent alternative scenarios on how a player’s payoff is
affected by the actions of others, covering many of the game-theoretic applications studied in the economic
literature. In particular, strategic substitutes encompass many scenarios that allow for free riding or have a
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public good structure of play, whereas strategic complements arise whenever the benefit that an individual
obtains from undertaking a given behavior is greater as more of her partners do the same.
Below, we first recall the framework by Galeotti et al. [14] under the assumption of incomplete information,
which is natural in many circumstances. Consider a society of n agents, placed on the nodes of a social
network. The links between agents reflect social interactions, and connected agents are said to be neighbors.
Every individual must choose independently an action in X = {0, 1}, where action 1 may be interpreted as
cooperating and action 0 as not doing so—or defecting. To define the payoffs, let xi be the action chosen by
agent i, Ni the set of i’s neighbors, xNi =
∑
j∈Ni
xj the aggregate action in Ni, and yi = xi + xNi . There is
a cost c, where 0 < c < 1, for choosing action 1, while action 0 bears no cost.
Strategic Substitutes: Best-shot game
The payoff function takes the form
pii = ΘH(yi − 1)− c xi, (1)
where ΘH(·) is the Heaviside step function ΘH(x) = 1 if x ≥ 0 and ΘH(x) = 0 otherwise. Strategic
substitutes thus represent an anti-coordination game: a player would prefer that someone of her neighbors
takes action 1 (rather than taking the action herself), but she would be willing to take action 1 if nobody
in the neighborhood does. In general, a context in which players have complete information on the social
network allows for a very rich set of Nash equilibria of the game [13,14], where the relation between network
connections, equilibrium actions and payoffs may exhibit very different patterns (even when all agents of
the same degree choose the same actions). Things change, however, by relaxing the assumption of complete
information—as shown in [14]. The assumption is that each player knows her own degree k′ and the prob-
ability distribution P (k|k′) of the degree k of her neighbors, which for uncorrelated networks (degrees of
neighboring nodes are independent) reads
P (k|k′) = kP (k)/k¯, (2)
where P (k) is the degree distribution of the network and k¯ =
∑
k kP (k) the average connectivity. Under
these conditions, Galeotti et al. [14] study the game within the framework of Bayesian games and show that
a player’s (pure) strategy σ ∈ X depends only on the degree k of the player. If an agent of degree k chooses
action 1 in equilibrium, it must be because she does not expect that any of her neighbors will choose action
1. Therefore, in an uncorrelated network, an agent of degree k − 1 faces a lower likelihood of an arbitrary
neighbor choosing the action 1, and would be best responding with action 1 as well. In particular [14], any
Nash equilibrium is characterized by a threshold τ , the smallest integer for which
1−
[
1−
τ∑
k=1
kP (k)
k¯
]τ
≥ 1− c, (3)
and an equilibrium σ must satisfy σ(k) = 1 for all k < τ , σ(k) = 0 for all k > τ and σ(τ) ∈ {0, 1} (i.e. σ(k)
is non-increasing).
Strategic Complements: Coordination game
The payoff function here takes the form
pii = (αxNi − c)xi, (4)
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where 0 < α < c. Strategic complements thus represent a coordination game. As for substitutes, in the case
of complete information there are generally many equilibria (including the case xi = 0 ∀i, which represents
full defection). Also here, by making the assumption that each player is only informed of her own degree
and has independent beliefs on the degrees of neighbors, it is possible to find much more definite predictions
with regard to equilibrium behavior [14]. In particular, independence of neighbor degrees implies that the
probability that a random neighbor chooses the action 1 cannot depend on one’s own degree (a player’s
neighbors do not know her degree and, consequently, they cannot know whether or not it will be convenient
for her to chose action 1), and the expectation of the sum of actions xNi of any agent i with |Ni| = k
neighbors is increasing in k. The structure of payoffs then assures that if a degree k agent is choosing the
action 1 in equilibrium, any agent of degree greater than k must be best responding with the action 1 as well,
as she should have as many cooperating neighbors as an agent of degree k − 1. Therefore every equilibrium
is characterized by an integer threshold τ [14] such that
α(τ − 1)
n−1∑
k=τ
kP (k)
k¯
< c and ατ
n−1∑
k=τ
kP (k)
k¯
≥ c. (5)
The equilibrium satisfies σ(k) = 0 for all k < τ , σ(k) = 1 for all k > τ and σ(τ) ∈ {0, 1} (in particular, σ(k)
is non-decreasing).
Summing up, for equilibrium strategies played once and for all under complete network information there
is no systematic relation between social networks and individual behavior and payoffs. By contrast, under
incomplete network information, both in games of strategic substitutes and of strategic complements, there
is a clear cut relation between networks and individual behavior, as decisions can in general be inferred from
degrees.
3 Evolutionary Dynamics
Whereas the previous section dealt with Bayes-Nash equilibria of one-shot strategic games under the settings
of complete and incomplete information, here we move to our contribution, namely an evolutionary scenario
in which agents play multiple instances of the game, and can adapt their strategy hoping to increase their
payoffs. We resort to an evolutionary game-theoretical approach in which agents do not make strategic
considerations about the network’s global structure and their position within it; instead, they base their
decision on their own actions/payoffs and on those of neighbors, as observed in the past. Our goal is to
study the resulting dynamics of the system as well as its equilibrium configurations, and check whether the
system can reach a Nash equilibrium, or what is the nature of the steady state if not Nash.
The evolutionary system can be described as follows. Starting with a fraction ρ0 of players randomly
chosen to undertake action x = 1, at each round t of the game: players collect their payoff pi(t)—given by
Eq.(1) and Eq.(4) respectively for strategic substitutes and complements; then a fraction q of players update
their strategy. We consider two different mechanisms for strategy updating.
Proportional Imitation (PI) [24] — It represents a rule of imitative nature in which player i may copy the
strategy of a selected counterpart j, which is chosen randomly among the Ni neighbors of i. The probability
that i copies j’s strategy depends on the difference between the payoffs that they obtained in the previous
4
round of the game:
P
{
x
(t)
j → x(t+1)i
}
=
{
(pi
(t)
j − pi(t)i )/Φ if pi(t)j > pi(t)i ,
0 otherwise,
(6)
where Φ is a normalization constant that ensures P{·} ∈ [0, 1]. Note that because of the imitation mechanism
of PI, the configurations xi = 1 ∀i and xi = 0 ∀i are absorbing states—the system cannot escape from them.
Best Response (BR) [25, 26] — Here players are fully rational and choose their strategy in order to
maximize their payoff, given what their neighbors did in the last round. This means that each player i, given
x
(t)
Ni
, computes the payoffs that she would obtain by choosing action 1 (cooperating) or 0 (defecting) at time
t, respectively p˜i
(t)
C and p˜i
(t)
D . Then
x
(t+1)
i =


1 if p˜i
(t)
C > p˜i
(t)
D ,
0 if p˜i
(t)
C < p˜i
(t)
D ,
x
(t)
i if p˜i
(t)
C = p˜i
(t)
D ,
(7)
We use PI because it is equivalent, for a well-mixed population, to the well-known replicator dynamics [17],
and BR because it is widely used in the economic literature. We then study how the system evolves starting
from the initial random distribution of strategies. In particular, we want to check whether the system can
reach a Nash equilibrium (a state where no player can increase her payoff by unilaterally changing her
strategy). Note, however, that whereas a Nash equilibrium is stable by definition under BR dynamics, with
PI this is not necessarily true: players can change action by copying better-performing neighbors, even if
such change deteriorates their payoffs. Hence in the latter case a potential stationary state of the system
does not necessarily correspond to a Nash equilibrium (unless the network is a complete graph [17]).
In what follows we present analytical and numerical results for the system described above. For simula-
tions, without loss of generality we set ρ0 = 1/2, c = 1/2 and q = 1/10—but our results are valid for all values
of these parameters in (0, 1).1 We will show averages over N = 20 independent realizations of the system,
an amount that we found enough to tame single-realization fluctuations (that are however shown with error
bars, when visible). Note that in numerical simulations, when the system arrives to a Nash equilibrium, we
change by hand the strategy of a random player in order to continue exploring other strategy configurations.
As stated in the introduction, we consider two representative kinds of population structure. Erdo¨s-Re´nyi
(ER) random graphs [19] are built by considering a collection of n nodes and adding a link between each
pair of nodes with probability p. The resulting networks are homogeneous, with degree distribution decaying
exponentially for large degree k and the average degree is k¯ = (n − 1) p = m. Scale-free (SF) random
networks are generated using a configuration model [27] with a constraint kmax <
√
n, which gives rise to
uncorrelated random networks [29] with degree distribution P (k) ∝ k−γ . The average degree depends on
the network size n and converges to a finite value as n diverges 2
k¯ =
γ − 1
γ − 2
[√
n
2−γ − k2−γmin√
n
1−γ − k1−γmin
]
−−−−→
n→∞
γ − 1
γ − 2 kmin =: m.
.
1Note that we have to impose the condition q < 1 to avoid possible trapping into period-2 loops, where all players change
action simultaneously at each round of the game, that can arise in anti-coordination under BR.
2In what follows we set γ = 2.5 and kmin = 3, and consider various sizes: n = 1000 (k¯ = 6.415), n = 10 000 (k¯ = 7.48),
n = 100 000 (k¯ = 8.13), n = 1000 000 (k¯ = 8.51). Note that for n→∞ it is m := k¯∞ = 9.
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4 Results
We now present the results of the numerical simulations. We recall that in Ref. [22] we analyzed the evolu-
tionary dynamics for the two games, under the same two evolutionary rules, by resorting to two analytical
approaches, the homogeneous mean-field (MF) and the heterogeneous mean-field (HMF). While we refer
to Ref. [22] for the complete analysis and detailed discussion, we include brief summaries of the analytical
predictions in the following, as tools to understand the simulation results. Note that the MF approach,
which should work best for homogeneous random graphs, deals with the aggregate density of cooperators
ρ(t), whereas, the HMF, which is more appropriate for heterogeneous networks, involves the computation
of the quantity Θ(t) =
∑
k kP (k)ρk(t)/k¯ (i.e., the average of the probability ρk that a node of degree k
cooperates, weighted by the relative degree).
4.1 Best-shot game
Proportional Imitation
In this case, the MF prediction is that
ρ(t) = [1 + (ρ−10 − 1) exp(cqt)]−1, 0 < ρ0 < 1. (8)
Hence the population converges to the state with no cooperators ρ = 0 (full defection), unless the initial state
is ρ0 = 1 (full cooperation). We see from Figure 1 that, also in simulations, the system always goes towards
the absorbing state xi = 0 ∀i ⇒ ρ ≡ 0 and the full dynamical evolution is in excellent agreement with
the MF theory. The convergence toward full defection occurs because a defector cannot copy a neighboring
cooperator (who has lower payoff by construction), whereas a cooperator will eventually copy one of her
neighboring defectors (who has higher payoff). However, full defection is not a Nash equilibrium as any
player surrounded by defectors would do better by cooperating.
100 101 102 103
t
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
ρ(
t)
ER (m=5)
ER (m=9)
ER (m=15)
SF (γ=2.5)
Figure 1: Best-shot games with Proportional Imitation: average ρ(t) for Erdo¨s-Re´nyi and scale-free graphs,
with n = 104 (but results are independent on the specific value of n). The red dashed curve is the MF
result—Eq.(8).
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t
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
ρ(
t)
100 101 102 103 104
t
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
u
(t)
ER (m=5)
ER (m=9)
ER (m=15)
SF (γ=2.5)
Figure 2: Best-shot games with Best Response: averages of ρ(t) and fraction u(t) of unsatisfied players (i.e.,
who would obtain higher payoff by unilaterally switching action, and with u = 0 indicating the falling of
the system into a Nash equilibrium) for Erdo¨s-Re´nyi and scale-free graphs, with n = 104 (again, results are
independent on the specific value of n).
In the case of scale-free networks, the behavior is again remarkably well described by the simple MF
approach, which coincides with the HMF as ρk(t = 0) does not depend on k.
Best Response
For the best-shot game with BR dynamics, the MF predicts that the final state is, for any initial condition,
a mixed state ρ = ρs, where ρs ∈ (0, 1) is the solution of the equation:
ρs = e
−mρs . (9)
The HMF approach leads to an analogous conclusion: the final state is Θs, which is the solution of the
equation
Θs =
∑
k
(1 −Θs)kkP (k)/k¯. (10)
Since BR dynamics is guaranteed to lead to Nash equilibria, ρs and Θs are the attractors of the dynamics,
their values depending only on the average degree of the network (in particular, they decrease for increasing
network connectivity) but not on ρ0, c or q.
Numerical simulations indeed confirm such a picture: the dynamics finds a rich variety of Nash equilibria
with intermediate cooperation level ρ∗ (Figure 2); moreover, ρ∗ decreases with increasing network connectiv-
ity (Figure 3)—in agreement with both Eq. (3) and Eq. (9). The key observation to understand the features
of such equilibria is that, in best-shot games under BR dynamics, a player switches to defection as soon as
one of her neighbors is a cooperator, and this happens with higher probability when the player has many
social ties (see also Figure 4). The higher values of ρ∗ in scale-free networks than in Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graphs (of
the same link density) can be explained by the presence, in the first case, of more low-degree nodes—who
preferentially cooperate as they have few neighbors to exploit. However, low-degree nodes weight less in Θ,
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so that we find a Θ∗ for random scale-free networks similar to the ρ∗ of Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs (in
agreement with the mean field predictions). 3
10 20 30
m
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
ρ∗
ρ* : simulations
ρg : eq.(3) - Ref.[14]
ρ
s
 : eq.(9) - MF
Figure 3: Best-shot games with Best Response on Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs: average ρ∗ at Nash equilibria
vs m from simulations (n = 104), theoretical prediction from Eq.(3), and MF Eq.(9).
0 10 20
k
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
ρ∗
(k)
ER (m=5)
ER (m=9)
ER (m=15)
10 100
k
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
ρ*
(k)
SF (γ=2.5, m=2)
Figure 4: Best-shot games with Best Response: average ρ∗(k) at Nash equilibria for nodes with different
degrees k. The vertical dashed lines identify the thresholds τ from Eq.(3)—which basically depend on m.
The Nash equilibria found dynamically can be compared with those derived under the assumption of
incomplete information by [14]—Eq.(3). We first inspect if the cooperation level of our equilibria lies in the
range ρg ∈ [ρk<τ , ρk≤τ ], where ρk<τ and ρk≤τ are the densities of players with k < τ and k ≤ τ , respectively,
and τ is given by Eq.(3). Figure 3 shows the average ρ∗ at Nash equilibria for Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs
as a function of m, obtained by numerical simulations, by the theoretical framework of [14], and by the mean
field approach. Clearly, whereas the trends are similar, we observe that the cooperation levels of the static
3This is due to nodes with the highest degrees—that make the difference in P (k)—not cooperating in the best-shot game,
so that their effects on the system is negligible and ρs ≃ Θs.
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equilibria are compatible with simulations only for small values of m, while the mean field approximation
works better for high average degrees. We then check whether ρ∗(k), i.e., the strategy profile as a function of
the degree k of dynamically-found Nash equilibria, is compatible with σ(k) from Eq. (3). Figure 4 shows that,
as predicted in [14], ρ∗(k) is generally non-increasing; however, the behavior is not step-like. Summing up,
the dynamics leads to Nash equilibria which share some qualitative features but do not coincide with those
identified in [14] under the assumption of incomplete information. Note that this does not occur because
the configuration space is not sufficiently explored4, but rather because the two approaches are intrinsically
different and do not have necessarily to give the same results. In fact, the equilibria that are evolutionary
selected by our deterministic BR-based dynamics are indeed proper Nash, whereas, the framework of [14] is
probabilistic and thus selects Bayes-Nash equilibria.
4.2 Coordination game
For coordination games the picture is richer, as the behavior of the system depends on the ratio α/c. Without
loss of generality, we leave c = 1/2 fixed and vary the value of α in the range (0, c).
Proportional imitation
The MF theory for the coordination game with PI predicts the existence of a critical value αc = c/(mρ0),
such that the final state of the dynamics is ρ = 0 (full defection) when α < αc, and ρ = 1 (full cooperation)
when α > αc. Note, however, that while full defection is always a Nash equilibrium for the coordination
game, full cooperation becomes a Nash equilibrium only when α > c/kmin, where kmin is the smallest degree
in the network—which means that only networks with kmin > c/α > 1 may feature a fully cooperative
Nash equilibrium. For Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graphs, numerical simulations agree with this picture (Figure 5), as a
discontinuous transition for α = αT is observed. The value αT of the transition point found numerically is
smaller than the MF prediction αc; however αT → αc as the average degree m grows. Note that apart from
full defection, no other Nash equilibrium (with intermediate cooperation levels) is found.
The HMF theory for PI dynamics predicts a discontinuous transition between a stable fully defective
equilibrium Θ = 0 for α < αc and full cooperation Θ = 1 for α > αc [22]. The critical value is now
αc = c/Θ2, where
Θ2 :=
∑
k
k2P (k)ρk/k¯. (11)
The quantity Θ2 is related to the second moment of the degree distribution 〈k2〉 and it can be shown to
diverge for networks with γ < 3 as the system size n goes to infinity. Therefore, at odds with the case of
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs, for scale-free networks the threshold αc → 0 as the system size n diverges.
This vanishing of the transition point is analogous to what occurs for other processes on scale-free networks,
such as percolation of epidemic spreading [30]. This phenomenon is due to the presence of hubs, i.e., the
nodes with very large degree (diverging with the network size n). For any value of α > 0, the payoffs piC
of cooperating for the largest hubs will become positive for sufficiently large values of n. Those hubs then
spread the cooperative strategy to the rest of the network.
4We have tried to manually drive the system into one of the equilibria derived by [14] with σ(k) = 1 for all k < τ , σ(k) = 0
for all k > τ , σ(τ) ∈ {0, 1}. To do so, we set at the beginning of the evolution a configuration with the action of players with
k < τ frozen to 1, the action of players with k > τ frozen to 0, and the action of players with k = τ free to evolve according to
BR. Across many realizations, the evolution never converges to a Nash equilibrium—what happens instead is that all players
with k = τ became satisfied (i.e., they cannot increase their payoffs by unilaterally chaniging action), but making unsatisfied
the others who cannot change action.
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(b)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
α
0
0.2
0.4
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0.8
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ρ ∞
m=3
m=5
m=9
m=15
m=23
(c)
Figure 5: Coordination games with Proportional Imitation. The vertical solid lines identify the values of
αc. Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs: (a) stationary cooperation levels ρ∞ vs α for m = 9 and various n; (c)
stationary cooperation levels ρ∞ vs α for n = 10
3 and various m. Note that for small values of m such that
p = m/(n− 1) < ln(n)/n the graph is disconnected: isolated nodes are bound to their initial action, so that
full defection and full cooperation are not accessible states; additionally, defective behavior spreads easily
inside isolated components which are poorly connected (also for high values of α), so that ρ∞ remains far
from 1. Scale-free networks: (b) stationary cooperation levels ρ∞ vs α for m = 9 and various n.
Numerical simulations of PI dynamics on scale-free networks confirm only in part the theoretical picture
(Figure 5). We observe a continuous transition between a fully defective Nash equilibrium, for small values
of α and final states with intermediate cooperation (which are not Nash equilibria) for α > αT . As α keeps
increasing, cooperation becomes the stable strategy for an increasing number of nodes, and the system heads
smoothly towards full cooperation—which in this case becomes a stable Nash equilibrium starting from
α = c/kmin (which is finite as kmin > 0 in the configuration model). The transition point αT tends to zero
as the system size grows. Hence HMF theory predicts correctly that the fully defective state disappears in
the large size limit (a phenomenon not captured by MF or by the one-shot results in [14]), but it fails in
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predicting that the transition is continuous.
Best Response
For coordination games under BR, the approximate MF calculations predict again the existence of a critical
value αc = c/(mρ0) such that for α ≪ αc the only Nash equilibrium is full defection, whereas, for α ≫ αc
the final state exhibits a large level ρ∗ of cooperation. Note that here any Nash equilibrium features players
with k < c/α being defectors by construction; therefore, the fully cooperative Nash equilibrium is achieved
for α≫ αc but only in networks with kmin > 1.
0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14
α
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
ρ ∞
n=103
n=104
n=105
(a)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
α
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
ρ ∞
n=103
n=104
n=105
(b)
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
α
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
ρ ∞
m=3
m=5
m=9
m=15
m=23
(c)
Figure 6: Coordination games with Best Response. The vertical solid lines identify the values of αc. Erdo¨s-
Re´nyi random graphs: (a) stationary cooperation levels ρ∞ vs α for m = 9 and various n; (c) stationary
cooperation levels ρ∞ vs α for n = 10
3 and various m. Note that as m decreases, the amount of nodes
with k < c/α increases; as these players are defectors by construction, ρ∞ 9 1 even for α → ∞. Scale-free
networks: (b) stationary cooperation levels ρ∞ vs α for m = 9 and various n.
The behavior found in numerical simulations is similar to the case of PI (Figure 6). On Erdo¨s-Re´nyi
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random graphs a discontinuous transition is found (players have similar degrees, and thus, for a given ρ,
they become cooperators for similar values of α). An important difference is that many non-trivial Nash
equilibria (with intermediate cooperation levels ρ∗) are found just above the transition point. A continuous
transition is found instead for scale-free networks. Here players have different degrees, and for a given ρ each
degree class requires its own value of α to switch to cooperation.
The HMF approach yields a self-consistent equation for the equilibrium Θs:
Θs =
∑
k>c/(αΘs)
kP (k)/k¯ (12)
If the network is scale-free with 2 < γ < 3, Θs represents a stable equilibrium whose dependence on α is of
the form Θs ∼ α(γ−2)/(3−γ), i.e., there exists a non-vanishing cooperation level Θs no matter how small the
value of α. However, if the network is homogeneous (e.g., γ > 3), Θs becomes unstable and for α → 0 the
system always falls in the fully defective Nash equilibria.
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Figure 7: Coordination games with Best Response: average ρ∗ at Nash equilibria from simulations and
theoretical prediction from Eq.(5). (a) ρ∗(m) for Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs with n = 104 at α = αc;
(b) ρ∗(α) for Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs with n = 103 and m = 9; (c) ρ∗(α) for scale-free networks with
n = 103 and m = 9. The vertical dashed lines denote the critical value αc.
The existence, in some intervals of α values, of Nash equilibria with intermediate levels of cooperation
calls for the comparison between the simulation results and the predictions of Ref. [14]. Figure 7(a) shows
that, for Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs at α = αc, the cooperation level of equilibria found dynamically lies
in the range ρg ∈ [ρk≥τ , ρk>τ ], where τ is given by Eq.(5). However, we do not find such a good agreement
for all values of α nor for scale-free networks (Figures 7b,c).
Another important prediction of the HMF approach is that ρk → 0 when k < c/(αΘs), and ρk → 1 for
k > c/(αΘs). In this sense, the equilibria predicted by HMF agree qualitatively with those found in [14]:
players’ actions show a non-decreasing dependence on their degrees. Indeed, Figure 8 shows that the average
cooperation level ρ∗(k) of Nash equilibria found dynamically in simulations for α = αc is generally non-
decreasing in k, and that a step-like behavior of σ(k), as predicted in [14], becomes a good approximation
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Figure 8: Coordination games with Best Response: average ρ∗(k) at Nash equilibria at α = αc for nodes
with different degrees k. The vertical dashed lines identify the thresholds τ form Eq.(5).
for large n. In conclusion, the equilibria predicted in [14], are a good approximation of the equilibria found
dynamically only in the thermodynamic limit (n→∞) and, more importantly, only for a small subset of α
values.
4.3 The effect of correlated networks
In order to study the effects of topologies with degree-degree correlations on the behavior of the games, we
run simulations with interaction patterns given by scale-free networks with assortative and disassortative
correlations. In particular, we consider networks generated using the prescriptions of the model by Weber
and Porto [28], again with the constraint kmax <
√
n on the largest degree. The correlation properties of the
resulting topologies are dependent on the model parameter β. The average degree of the nearest-neighbors
of a node of degree k, knn(k) :=
∑
j jP (j|k), is proportional to kβ , so that for β > 0 neighbors of nodes with
large k have large degree (assortative networks), while for β < 0 nodes with large k have neighbors with
small degree and vice versa (disassortative networks). The uncorrelated case is recovered for β = 0.
For the best-shot game (Fig. 9), the simple case of PI dynamics is totally unaffected by the presence
of correlations: the temporal evolution and the asymptotic state do not depend at all on β. Instead,
when strategies evolve according to BR, the dynamics leads to Nash equilibria with levels ρ∗ of cooperation
(dominated by the behavior of low-degree nodes) that decrease with β. The reason is that for β < 0 low-
degree nodes are connected to hubs, which are likely to be defectors; as a consequence they tend to cooperate
and ρ∗ is higher. The opposite occurs in assortative networks (β > 0): low-degree nodes are connected to
each other and less cooperation is needed.
For coordination games with PI dynamics, the effect of assortative (disassortative) correlations is to make
broader (sharper) the transition observed as a function of α for finite network size n (Fig. 10). This can
be understood by considering that, in the assortative case, hubs tend to be connected with each other, so
that cooperation can spread more easily among them and be sustained by mutual connections: the critical
density of stable cooperators decreases. At the same time, low-degree nodes are connected only with each
other, so that they require larger values of α to sustain cooperation within themselves (as compared to
the uncorrelated case). As a result, the transition becomes broader. An analogous argument explains the
sharper transition for dissortative networks. In the case of BR dynamics, the same picture applies.
In conclusion, degree-degree correlations of the interaction pattern do not change the qualitative features
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Figure 9: Best-shot games for correlated networks with m = 9, n = 104 and various β. Again, these results
are independent on the specific value of n. Proportional Imitation: (a) ρ(t)—the red dashed curve being the
MF Eq.(8). Best Response: (b) ρ(t) and (c) fraction u(t) of unsatisfied players (with u = 0 indicating the
falling of the system into a Nash equilibrium).
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Figure 10: Coordination games with PI (a) and BR (b) for correlated networks with m = 9, n = 104 and
various β. Again, these results are independent on the specific value of n. The vertical lines identify the
values of αc.
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of the behavior of games on scale-free networks.
5 Summary and Conclusion
In this work we have studied by numerical simulations two kinds of games, namely the best-shot and the
coordination games, as representatives of two wide classes of social interactions (strategic substitutes and
strategic complements, respectively). In these games, the welfare of a player depends both on her own
actions and on the actions taken by her partners; thus, we have considered different topological structures
for the pattern of interactions. We have embedded these games into an evolutionary framework, described
by two types of dynamics, widely employed to model evolving populations: Proportional Imitation, in
which players imitate more successful neighbors, and Best Response, in which players are rational and make
optimal choices. We have performed numerical simulations, determining the attractors of the evolution, and
characterizing them in term of Nash equilibria. By comparison with the results of numerical simulations we
have assessed the validity of the mean field approaches in describing such systems, and we have also compared
our findings with the theoretical predictions of [14] about the features of Nash equilibria in one-shot games
under incomplete information.
Generally, we observe that the behavior of the system is highly influenced by the dynamics employed
and by the population structure. Strategic substitutes under PI dynamics represents the simplest case, in
which full defection is the only accessible (but non-Nash) equilibrium, whatever the underlying topology, in
complete agreement with the mean field predictions. This suggests that the failure to find a Nash equilibrium
arises from the (bounded rational) dynamics and, with the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that imitation is
not a good procedure for players to decide in anti-coordination games. Such a conclusion is supported by
the behavior observed for strategic substitutes under BR dynamics. Indeed, here we observe many stable
Nash equilibria, with cooperation level ρ∗ slightly smaller than (but close to) the mean field prediction ρc.
Moreover, in simulations we observe precisely what is predicted by the MF theory, namely that ρ∗ decreases
with increasing network connectivity and does not depend on the initial conditions, game and simulation
parameters, and system size (which was taken as infinite in the analytical calculations). Concerning the
topology, ρ∗ is enhanced in heterogeneous networks because of more low-degree nodes who are typically
cooperators. Additionally, disassortativity has a positive effect on the cooperation levels, as low-degree
nodes are connected to high-degree nodes who are likely to be defectors, and thus tend to cooperate even
more. Vice versa, assortativity allows more low-degree nodes to defect.
The picture is far more rich and interesting for strategic complements, that feature an additional param-
eter α playing a key role in determining which equilibria are dynamically accessible. Indeed, in the case of
PI for Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs we observe two kinds of stationary states: fully defective Nash equilibria
for α < αT , and full cooperation for α > αT (that becomes Nash equilibrium only when α > c/kmin).
Remarkably, αT → αc for n,m → ∞, where αc = c/(mρ0) is the value predicted by the MF theory. We
thus see that imitation is indeed a good procedure to choose actions in a coordination setup: PI does lead
to Nash equilibria, and indeed it makes a very precise prediction: a unique equilibrium that depends on
the initial density. If the topology is scale-free, HMF theory and simulations agree on αT and αc going to
zero for n → ∞, indicating that in these cases cooperation emerges also when the incentive to cooperate
vanishes. The situation with BR dynamics is rather similar to the case of PI, with the single difference that
for Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs and α > αc the stationary state is now a Nash equilibrium, and again full
cooperation is achieved for α > c/kmin. Thus we see that, with BR, equilibria with intermediate values of
the density of cooperators are obtained in a range of initial densities. Compared to the situation with PI, in
which we only find the absorbing states as equilibria, this points to the fact that more rational players can
15
eventually converge to equilibria with higher payoffs. Finally, we have found that, whatever the dynamics,
the presence of topological correlations in the network does not change the global qualitative picture.
Besides the general features of the dynamics, we have also been able to study the degree-dependent
features of Nash equilibria (when present) and compare our findings with the theoretical predictions of [14],
in the which authors consider games played once and for all but using only partial information on the
underlying topology. Our conclusion is that, while the Nash equilibria predicted in [14] cannot (always) be
reached, their theory still provides good guidance on the shape and features of the Nash equilibria which are
evolutionarily accessible.
Finally, it is interesting to note that, as in [31, 32], we find that the outcome of the evolution depends
on the dynamics and the network properties. Remarkably, here we go beyond those works as our study of
individual behaviors allows us to make a connection with the results obtained in a more traditional economic
framework.
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